Many techniques for privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) have been investigated over the past decade. Such techniques, however, usually incur heavy computational and communication cost on the participating parties and thus entities with limited resources may have to refrain from participating in the PPDM process. To address this issue, one promising solution is to outsource the tasks to the cloud environment. In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient solution to privacy-preserving outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC) for multiple users based on the k-means clustering algorithm. The main novelty of our solution lies in avoiding the secure division operations required in computing cluster centers through efficient transformation techniques. In addition, we discuss two strategies, namely offline computation and pipelined execution that aim to boost the performance of our protocol. We implement our protocol on a cluster of 16 nodes and demonstrate how our two strategies combined with parallelism can significantly improve the performance of our protocol through extensive experiments using a real dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clustering [1] is one of the widely used techniques in various data mining applications in several fields, including information retrieval [2] , machine learning [3] , and pattern recognition [4] . Real-life applications related to clustering include categorizing results returned by a search engine in response to a user's query, and grouping persons into categories based on their DNA information.
In general, if the data involved in clustering belongs to a single entity (hereafter referred to as a user), then it can be done in a trivial fashion. However, in some cases, multiple users, such as companies, governmental agencies, and health care organizations, each holding a dataset, may want to collaboratively perform clustering on their combined data and share the clustering results. Due to privacy concerns, users may not be willing to share their data with the other users and thus the distributed clustering task should be executed in a privacy-preserving manner.
Existing methods for privacy-preserving distributed clustering (PPDC) (e.g., [5] - [8] ) incur significant cost (computation, communication and storage) on the participating users and thus they are not suitable if the users do not have sufficient resources to perform the clustering task. To address these issues, it is more attractive for the users to outsource their data as well as the clustering task to the cloud. However, the cloud cannot be fully trusted by the users in protecting their data. Thus, to ensure data confidentiality, users can encrypt their databases locally (using a common public key) and then outsource them to the cloud. Then, the goal is for the cloud to perform clustering over the aggregated encrypted data. We refer to the above process as privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC).
It is worth noting that if all the encrypted data resides on a single cloud, then the only way for the cloud to execute the clustering task (assuming that users do not participate in the clustering process), without ever decrypting the data, is when the data is encrypted using fully homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., [9] ). Past results [10] , however, show that fully homomorphic encryption schemes are very expensive and their usage in practical applications is decades away.
In this paper, we propose a new and efficient solution to the PPODC problem based on the standard k-means clustering algorithm [11] , [12] with the use of two cloud service providers (say Amazon and Google) which together form a federated cloud environment. Our proposed solution protects data confidentiality of all the participating users at all times.
A. System Model and Problem Definition
In our problem, we consider n users denoted by U 1 , . . . , U n . Assume that user U i holds a database T i with m i data records and l attributes, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider a scenario where the n users want to outsource their databases as well as the k-means clustering process on their combined databases to a cloud environment. In our system model, we consider two different entities: (i) the users and (ii) the cloud service providers. We assume that the users choose two cloud service providers C 1 and C 2 to perform the clustering task on their combined data.
We explicitly assume that C 1 and C 2 are semi-honest 1 [13] and they do not collude. After proper service level agreements with the users, C 2 generates a public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier cryptosystem [14] and broadcasts pk to all users and C 1 . A more robust setting would be for C 1 and C 2 to jointly generate the public key pk based on the threshold Paillier cryptosystem (e.g., [15] , [16] ) such that the corresponding secret key sk is obliviously split between the two clouds. Under this case, the secret key sk is unknown to both clouds and only (random) shares of it are revealed to C 1 and C 2 . For simplicity, we consider the former asymmetric setting where C 2 generates (pk, sk) in the rest of this paper. Given the above system architecture, we assume that user U i encrypts T i attribute-wise using pk and outsources the encrypted database to C 1 . Another way to outsource the data is for users to split each attribute value in their database into two random shares and outsource the shares separately to each cloud (see Section V-B for more details). Having outsourced the data, the main goal of a PPODC protocol is to enable C 1 and C 2 to perform k-means clustering over the combined encrypted databases in a privacy-preserving manner. More formally, we can define a PPODC protocol as follows: PPODC( T1, . . . , Tn , β) → (S1, . . . , Sn) (1) where β is a threshold value agreed upon by all parties and used to check whether the termination condition holds in each iteration of the k-means algorithm (see Sections III and V for more details). Depending on the users' requirements, S i (output received by U i ) can be the the global cluster centers and/or the final cluster IDs corresponding to the data records of U i . In this paper, we consider the former case under which S i 's are the same for all users. In general, a PPODC protocol should meet the following requirements:
• Data Confidentiality: The contents of U i 's database T i should never be revealed to other users, C 1 and C 2 . • Accuracy: The output received by each party (i.e., S i 's) should be the same as in the standard k-means algorithm. • No Participation of Users: Compared to the tasks outsourced to the clouds, the communication and computational costs on the users are negligible.
B. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this work are listed below:
• We propose new transformations that enable our proposed protocol to i) securely assign the data records to the closest clusters (see Sections IV-A and V-A), and ii) securely evaluate the termination condition over encrypted data (see Sections IV-B and V-A). • The proposed solution satisfies all the desirable properties of PPODC mentioned in the previous subsection. Specifically, we show that the proposed protocol is secure under the standard semi-honest model (see Section V-C). • We present two strategies to improve the performance of our protocol. Namely, offline computation of data independent results and pipelined execution of underlying secure primitives (see Section V-E). • We demonstrate how the performance of our protocol can be drastically improved using parallel implementation together with the above techniques on a cluster of 16 nodes (see Section VI). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III introduces definitions and properties related to k-means clustering algorithm. Section IV presents our new transformation techniques. Section V discusses our proposed PPODC solution in detail. Also, we analyze the security guarantees of PPODC and discuss two performance improvement strategies. Section VI presents our experimental results based on a real-world dataset under different parameter settings. Finally, we conclude the paper along with future research in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK Several techniques have been proposed for the clustering task under the privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) model (e.g., [5] - [8] ). In PPDM, each user owns a piece of a dataset (typically a vertically or horizontally partitioned dataset) and the goal is for them to collaboratively perform the clustering task on the combined data in a privacy-preserving manner. On the other hand, our work is motivated by the cloud computing model where users can outsource their encrypted databases to a federated cloud environment. Under our problem setting, the federated cloud performs the clustering task over encrypted data and the users do not participate in any of the underlying computations. Hence, existing PPDM techniques for the clustering task are not applicable to the PPODC problem.
Only recently, researchers have started to focus on the clustering task in an outsourced environment (e.g., [17] - [19] ). In [17] , Upmanyu et al. give a solution to privacy-preserving k-means clustering for data records collected from n users based on secret sharing scheme where at least three noncolluding cloud service providers are required to perform the computation. The work by Lin [18] proposes to utilize the randomized kernel matrix to protect the data privacy in the problem of outsourced kernel k-means computations. Only one service provider is needed in Lin's scheme. But, it is not clear that how much information is disclosed to the service provider since its security is not formally proved in the semihonest model. The work by Liu et al. [19] is perhaps the most recent work along this direction. However, their solution has the following limitations: (i) it assumes that there is only a single user who wants to perform the clustering task on his/her own data and (ii) the user is required to execute certain intermediate computations and thus needs to be part of the clustering process. Unlike the approach in [19] , our solution is proposed under the multi-user setting and the users can completely outsource the computations of the clustering task to a federated cloud environment in a privacy-preserving manner.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Definition 1: Suppose c = {t 1 , . . . , t h } denote a cluster where t 1 , . . . , t h are data records with l attributes. Then, the center of cluster c is defined as a vector μ c given by [8] :
where t i [s] denotes the s th attribute value of t i and λ c [s] denotes the sum of s th attribute values of all the data records in cluster c, for 1 ≤ i ≤ h. Also, |c| denotes the number of data records in c.
In the above definition, the s th attribute value in μ c is equivalent to the mean of the s th attribute values of all the data records in cluster c. Note that, if the cluster contains a single data record, then the cluster center is the same as the corresponding data record.
A. Euclidean Distance between t i and c
We now discuss how to compute the similarity score between a given data record t i and a cluster c. In general, the similarity score between any two records can be computed using one of the standard similarity metrics, such as Euclidean distance or Cosine similarity. In this paper, we use the Euclidean distance as the underlying similarity metric since the standard k-means algorithm is based on this metric [8] , [19] .
Definition 2: For any given data record t i and cluster c, let μ c denote the cluster center of c (as per Definition 1). Then the Euclidean distance between t i and c is given as
In a similar manner, the Euclidean distance between any two given clusters c and c can be computed using their respective cluster centers. More specifically, c − c is given as
where μ c and μ c denote the cluster centers of c and c , respectively. Also, |c| and |c | denote the number of data records in c and c .
B. Single Party k-Means Clustering
Consider a user U who wants to apply the k-means clustering algorithm [11] , [12] on his/her own database of m records, denoted by {t 1 , . . . , t m }. Here we assume that U wants to compute k cluster centers, denoted by μ c 1 , . . . , μ c k , as the output. However, other desired values, such as the final cluster IDs assigned to each data record can also be part of the output. Since k-means clustering is an iterative algorithm, U has to input a threshold value to decide when to stop the algorithm (termination condition). Without loss of generality, let β denote the threshold value. For simplicity, throughout this paper, we assume that the initial set of k clusters are chosen at random (referred to as the Initialization step).
We briefly describe the main steps involved in the traditional (single party) k-means clustering process [11] , [12] in the following. Apart from the initialization step, the algorithm involves three main stages: (i) Assignment (ii) Update, and (iii) Termination. In the initialization step, k data records are selected at random and assigned as the initial clusters c 1 , . . . , c k with their centers (or mean vectors) denoted by μ c1 , . . . , μ c k , respectively. In the assignment stage, for each data record t i , the algorithm computes the Euclidean distance between t i and each cluster c j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The algorithm identifies the cluster corresponding to the minimum distance as the closest cluster to t i (say c h ) and assigns t i to a new cluster c h , where h ∈ [1, k] . In the update stage, the algorithm computes the centers of the new clusters, denoted by μ c 1 , . . . , μ c k . Finally, in the termination stage, the algorithm verifies whether the sum of the squared Euclidean distances between the current and new clusters is upper-bounded by β. If the termination condition holds, then the algorithm halts and returns the new cluster centers as the final output. Otherwise, the algorithm continues to the next iteration with the new clusters as input.
IV. THE PROPOSED TRANSFORMATIONS
It is important to note that cluster centers (denoted by μ c for a cluster c) are represented as vectors and the entries in the vectors can be fractional values. Since the encryption schemes typically support integer values, we should somehow transform the entries of the cluster centers into integer values without affecting their utility in the k-means clustering process. Therefore, we first define scaling factors for clusters and then discuss a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance function operating over integers. Also, we discuss how to transform the termination condition in k-means clustering algorithm with fractional values into an integer-valued one.
Definition 3: Consider the cluster c i whose center is denoted by μ ci (based on Definition 1). We know that μ ci is a vector and each entry can be a fractional value with denominator |c i |, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define the scaling factor for c i , denoted by α i , as below:
Also, we define α = k j=1 |c j | as the global scaling factor.
A. Order-Preserving Euclidean Distance
In the assignment stage of k-means clustering, the first step is to compute the Euclidean distance between a data record t i and each cluster c j , denoted by
|cj| . In order to compute the encrypted value of t i − c j , we need to avoid such fractional values without affecting the relative ordering among the k Euclidean distances
. . , c k denote k clusters. Note that since t i has to be assigned to the nearest cluster, it is important to preserve the relative ordering among the computed k Euclidean distances. For this purpose, we propose a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance function whose evaluation involves only integer values.
We define the order-preserving Euclidean distance (OPED) function between a data record t i and a cluster c j as follows:
where α and α j denote the global and c j 's scaling factors, respectively. Observe that all the terms in the above equation are integer values (here each attribute is explicitly assumed to take only integer values). Moreover, following Definition 3, we can rewrite the above equation as:
Since α remains constant for any given set of k clusters (in a particular iteration), we claim that the above OPED function preserves the relative ordering among cluster centers for any given data record. More specifically, given a data record t i and two clusters c j and c j , if
B. Termination Condition -Transformation
In the k-means clustering process (see Section III-B), the termination condition is given by:
where c 1 , . . . , c k and c 1 , . . . , c k denote the current and new set of clusters in an iteration, respectively. Remember that
and clearly it consists of fractional values. In order to evaluate this condition over encrypted values, we first need to transform the above termination condition so that all the components are integers.
To achieve this, we use the following approach. We define a constant scaling factor (denoted by f ) for the termination condition in such a way that by multiplying both sides of Equation 5 with f 2 , we can cancel all the denominator values. More specifically, we define the scaling factor for the termination condition as f = k j=1 |c j | * |c j |. Also, we define the scaling factor for the cluster pair (c j , c j ) as
Then we define the new termination condition as follows:
Observe that the above equation consists of only integer values. Now we need to show that evaluating the above equation is the same as evaluating Equation 5 . First, we divide the above equation by f 2 on both sides of the inequality. Note that since f 2 remains constant in a given iteration, multiplication of both sides of Equation 6 by f 2 has no effect on the inequality. That is, Equation 6 can be rewritten as:
The left-hand side of the above equation can be expanded as below:
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that evaluating the inequality k j=1 c j − c j 2 ≤ β is the same as evaluating Equation 6 . Hence, in our proposed PPODC protocol, we consider Equation 6 as the termination condition of k-means clustering and evaluate it in a privacy-preserving manner.
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we first discuss a set of privacy-preserving primitives. Then, we present our novel PPODC protocol that utilizes the above transformation techniques and the privacypreserving primitives as building blocks. As mentioned in Section I-A, in this paper we consider two semi-honest and noncolluding cloud service providers C 1 and C 2 under the Paillier cryptosystem [14] . Specifically, C 2 generates a pair of publicsecret key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier's scheme such that sk is kept private whereas the corresponding public key pk is broadcasted. Let E pk (·) and D sk (·) denote the encryption and decryption functions under Paillier cryptosystem and N denote the RSA modulus. Note that, under Paillier's encryption
A. Privacy-Preserving Primitives
We discuss a set of privacy-preserving primitives under the above two-party (i.e., C 1 and C 2 ) computation model.
E pk (b) , and the goal of the SMP protocol is for
where z is unknown to both parties and 0 ≤ z < 2 w , the goal of SBD is for C 1 to retrieve encryptions of the individual bits of z. The output is [z] = E pk (z 1 ), . . . , E pk (z w ) , where z 1 (resp., z w ) denotes the most (resp. least) significant bit of z. Several solutions have been proposed for most of the above privacy-preserving primitives. In particular, efficient implementation of SMP and SSED can be found in [20] , [21] , and an SBD realization was given in [22] . Furthermore, an efficient solution to SC was proposed in [23] . Based on the primitives described above, we are able to construct three other secure primitives that are needed in our proposed PPODC protocol, namely SSED OP , SMIN k , and SETC. In the following we give the input to and output from these primitives.
• Secure Squared Order-Preserving Euclidean Distance (SSED OP ): C 1 holds an encrypted data record, denoted by E pk (t i ), and an encrypted cluster, denoted by E pk (c h ), the goal of SSED OP is for C 1 and
The goal of SMIN k is for C 1 to securely identify the array position corresponding to the minimum value among the k numbers. More specifically, if j th integer is the minimum number among the k values, then the output of SMIN k is an encrypted vector Γ such that Γ j is E pk (1) and all the other entries contain encryptions of 0, where j ∈ [1, k].
• Secure Evaluation of Termination Condition (SETC):
Given that β is public and that C 1 additionally holds the encrypted current and new clusters, i.e.,
and E pk (λ c h ) are as defined in SSED OP , SETC returns γ = 1 to both C 1 and C 2 if Equation 6
evaluates to true and γ = 0 otherwise.
We now describe how to implement those three primitive above, i.e., SSED OP , SMIN k , and SETC. A more detailed description is also available in the full version of this paper [24] .
1) The SSED OP Protocol: We discuss a novel solution to the SSED OP problem using the SMP and SSED protocols as sub-routines. The main steps involved in the proposed SSED OP protocol are described as follows. We assume that C 1 holds E pk (c 1 ), . . . , E pk (c k ) and C 2 holds sk, where c 1 , . . . , c k denote k clusters and E pk (c
To start with, C 1 and C 2 securely compute the scaling factor for cluster c h (in encrypted format based on Equation 3) using the extended secure multiplication protocol, denoted by SMP k−1 , which takes k −1 encrypted inputs and multiplies them (within encryption). Specifically, they jointly compute
where α h is the scaling factor for cluster c h as defined in Equation 3. Then C 1 and C 2 securely multiply b h with E pk (|c h |) using SMP to get b = SMP(b h , E pk (|c h |)) = E pk (|c 1 | * . . . * |c k |) = E pk (α), where α is the global scaling factor. After this, for 1 ≤ s ≤ l, C 1 and C 2 jointly compute two encrypted vectors as follows:
Finally, with the two encrypted vectors a i and a h as C 1 's input, C 1 and C 2 jointly compute the encrypted squared Euclidean distance between them using SSED. Specifically, the output
, it is clear that the output SSED(a i , a h ) is equivalent to E pk ((OPED(t i , c h )) 2 ).
2) The SMIN k Protocol: In the following, we describe how we realize our SMIN k protocol by extending the SMIN k given in [21] , which outputs to C 1 the encryption of the array index corresponding to the minimum value.
• Let E pk (I min ) be the output (known only to C 1 ) computed using the SMIN k protocol given in [21] , where I min ∈ [1, k] denotes the index corresponding to the minimum value among the k input values. Now C 1 computes E pk (i − I min ) and randomizes it to get φ[i] = E pk (r i * (i−I min )), where r i denotes a random number in Z N and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Observe that exactly one of the entries in φ is equal to encryption of 0 (i.e., when i = I min ) and the rest are encryptions of random values. Hereafter, r ∈ R Z N denotes a random number r in Z N .
Here π is a random permutation function from [1, k] to [1, k] known only to C 1 . 3) The SETC Protocol: The main steps involved in SETC are given in detail below:
• To start with, C 1 and C 2 compute τ i = E pk (|c i | * |c i |) using E pk (|c i |), E pk (|c i |) as C 1 's private input to the SMP protocol, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The output τ i is known only to C 1 .
where τ i = (τ j ) j∈ [1,k] ∧j =i . Here SMP k−1 denotes the SMP protocol with k − 1 encrypted inputs that need to be securely multiplied. More specifically,
where f i is the scaling factor for cluster pair (c i , c i ) defined in Section IV-B. Then, they compute an en-
• After this, they securely multiply V 1 and τ 1 using SMP protocol. The output of this step is
, where f is the scaling factor for the termination condition as defined in Section IV-B. They compute Y = SMP(V, V ) = E pk (f 2 ). • For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, C 1 and C 2 securely multiply each component in the current and new clusters with |c i | and |c i |, respectively. Specifically, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l, they compute
Note that W i [s] computed in Stage 2 equals E pk (λ c i [s]). • Now, by using the secure squared Euclidean distance (SSED) protocol with input vectors G i and G i , C 1 and C 2 jointly compute H i = SSED(G i , G i ). More precisely, they compute the encryption of squared Euclidean distance between vectors in G i and G i given by
• Given Z i and H i , C 1 and C 2 can securely multiply them using SMP to get
At the end of the above process, C 1 has Y = E pk (f 2 ) and H i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now C 1 locally computes:
At this point, C 1 has encryptions of the integers corresponding to both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the termination condition given in Equation 6 . Therefore, the goal is to now securely compare them using the secure comparison (SC) protocol. However, the existing SC protocols (e.g., [23] ) require encryptions of individual bits of the integers to be compared rather than the encrypted integers itself. Hence, we need to first convert the encrypted integers of the left-hand and righthand sides into their respective encrypted bit representations using the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) protocol. Given β and M , they can be securely compared as follows:
• C 1 and C 2 convert β and M into their encrypted bit vectors using the SBD sub-protocol. Specifically, they
Note that [x] denotes the encrypted bit vector of an integer x. Also, remember that the outputs of SBD, i.e., L and R, are known only to C 1 .
• By using L and R as C 1 's private input to the SC protocol, C 1 and C 2 securely evaluate the termination condition:
The output γ = SC(L, R) = 1 if the termination condition holds, and γ = 0 otherwise (here γ is known to C 1 and C 2 ).
B. The Proposed PPODC Protocol
In this sub-section, we discuss our proposed PPODC protocol which is based on the standard k-means algorithm discussed in Section III-B. As mentioned in Section I-A, our system model consists of n users denoted by U 1 , . . . , U n . User U j holds a database T j of m j data records with l attributes, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Without loss of generality, let the aggregated database be T = n j=1 T j = {t 1 , . . . , t m }, where m = n j=1 m j denotes the total number of records in T . For simplicity, let t 1 . . . t m1 belong to U 1 , t m1+1 , . . . , t m1+m2 belong to U 2 , and so on. We assume that all users agree upon using two cloud service providers C 1 and C 2 for outsourcing their respective databases as well as the k-means clustering task. Remember that, in our system model, C 2 generates a public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier cryptosystem [14] and the public key pk is sent to all users and C 1 .
After the users outsource their data (encrypted under pk) to C 1 , the goal of PPODC is to enable C 1 and C 2 to jointly compute the global cluster centers using the aggregated encrypted data in a privacy-preserving manner. At a high level, our protocol computes the global cluster centers in an iterative manner until the pre-defined termination condition (given in Equation 6 ) holds.
The overall steps involved in the proposed PPODC protocol are given in Algorithm 1. Our protocol consists of 3 stages. Now we describe each of them in detail.
1) Stage 1 -Secure Data Outsourcing (SDO): Data are typically encrypted before being outsourced for privacy reasons. However, to avoid computation overhead on the users side due to having to encrypt their data, we consider the following approach for data outsourcing. User U j generates two random shares for each attribute value of his/her data record t i . More precisely, for the s th attribute of data record t i , U j generates two random shares (t
and t 2 i [s] to C 1 and C 2 , respectively, instead of encrypting the database attributewise and outsourcing it to C 1 . Thus, we are able to avoid heavy encryption costs on the users during the data outsourcing step. Here we assume that there exist secure communication channels, which can be established using standard mechanisms such as SSL, between user U j and the two clouds C 1 and C 2 . Each user U j sends the random shares of his/her data to C 1 and C 2 separately through the secure communication channels.
Upon receiving the random shares of all data records, C 2 computes E pk (t 2 i [s]) and sends it to C 1 . Then,
2) Stage 2 -Secure Computation of New Clusters: Given the (attribute-wise) encrypted versions of users data, during Stage 2 (denoted by SCNC), C 1 and C 2 jointly compute the new cluster centers in a privacy-preserving manner. To start with, C 1 randomly selects k encrypted data records (from the aggregated data) and assigns them as initial clusters. More specifically, the k encrypted data records are assigned to E pk (λ c1 ), . . . , E pk (λ c k ), respectively. For example, if the 3rd data record is selected as the first cluster c 1 , then E pk (λ c1 [s]) is set to E pk (t 3 [s]), for 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Also, E pk (|c h |) is set to E pk (1) since each initial cluster c h consists of only one data record, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k.
For each encrypted data record E pk (t i ), C 1 and C 2 compute the squared Euclidean distance between t i and all the clusters based on the order-preserving Euclidean distance function given in Equation 4. To achieve this, C 1 and C 2 jointly execute SSED OP with E pk (t i ) and E pk (c h ) as C 1 's private input, for 2 . Now, C 1 and C 2 jointly execute the following set of operations:
• By using E pk (d i [h]) as C 1 's private input to the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) sub-protocol, 
(a). Select k records at random and assign them to initial clusters denoted by E pk (λc 1 ), . . . , E pk (λc k ), where c1, . . . , c k denote the current clusters
(a). C1 and C2: 
|c h | and Sj ← Sj ∪ {μ c h } values in Γ i are encryptions of 0. Note that the output of SMIN k , i.e., Γ i , is known only to C 1 . • After this, C 1 and C 2 securely multiply Γ i,h with E pk (t i [s]) using the secure multiplication (SMP) sub-protocol. More precisely, C 1 and C 2 compute Λ i,h [s] = SMP(Γ i,h , E pk (t i [s])). The observation here is that since Γ i,g = E pk (1) only if t i is closest to cluster c g , Λ i,g = E pk (t i ) denoting that t i is assigned to new cluster c g . Also, Λ i,h is a vector of encryptions of 0, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and h = g. Next, C 1 computes the new cluster centers locally by performing homomorphic operations on Λ i,h and Γ i,h as follows:
• Compute (in encrypted format) the s th -component of the numerator for the center of new cluster c h as
.
|c h | denotes the center of cluster c h .
• Compute the encrypted number of data records that belong to the new cluster c h as E pk (|c
3) Stage 3 -Secure Termination or Update (STOU):
Given the new clusters (in encrypted format) resulting from Stage 2, the goal of Stage 3 is for C 1 and C 2 to verify whether the termination condition (based on Equation 6) holds in a privacy-preserving manner. If the termination condition holds, the new cluster centers are returned as the final output to U j . Otherwise, the entire iterative process (i.e., Stages 2 and 3) is repeated by using the new clusters as the current clusters. The current and new clusters are Ω = { E pk (λ c1 ), E pk (|c 1 |) , . . . , E pk (λ c k ), E pk (|c k |) } and Ω = { W 1 , E pk (|c 1 |) . . . , W k , E pk (|c k |) }), respectively. Finally, once the termination condition has been securely evaluated by the invocation of SETC, C 1 locally proceeds as follows:
• If γ = 1 (i.e., when the termination condition holds), the newly computed clusters are the final clusters which need to be sent to each user U j . For this purpose, C 1 takes the help of C 2 to obliviously decrypt the results related to the new cluster centers. More specifically, C 1 initially picks random numbers r |c h | and adds it to his/her resulting set S j .
• Otherwise, when γ = 0, C 1 locally updates the current clusters to new clusters by setting E pk (λ c h ) = W h and E pk (|c h |) = E pk (|c h |), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k. Then, the above process is iteratively repeated until the termination condition holds, i.e., the protocol goes to
Step 3 of Algorithm 1 and executes Steps 3 to 6 with the updated cluster centers as input.
C. Security Analysis
Our proposed PPODC protocol is secure under the semihonest model [13] . Specifically, in the data outsourcing process (i.e., Step 1 of Algorithm 1), the values received by C 1 and C 2 are random values in Z N . At the end of the data outsourcing step, only C 1 knows the encrypted data records of all users and no information regarding the contents of T j (the database of user U j ) is revealed to C 2 . Therefore, as long as the underlying encryption scheme is semantically secure (which is the case for the Paillier cryptosystem [16] ), the aggregated encrypted databases do not reveal any information to C 1 . Hence, no information is revealed to C 1 and C 2 during Stage 1 of PPODC.
The computations involved in Stages 2 and 3 of PPODC are performed by either C 1 locally or using one of the privacypreserving primitives as a sub-routine. In the former case, C 1 operates on encrypted data locally. In the latter case, the privacy-preserving primitives utilized in our protocol are secure under the semi-honest model [20] - [22] . Also, it is important to note that the output of a privacy-preserving primitive which is given as input to the next primitive is encrypted. Since we use a semantically secure Paillier encryption scheme [14] , all the encrypted results (which are revealed only to C 1 ) from the privacy-preserving primitives do not reveal any information to C 1 . Note that the secret key sk is unknown to C 1 . By Composition Theorem [13] , we claim that the sequential composition of the privacy-preserving primitives invoked in Stages 2 and 3 of our proposed PPODC protocol is secure under the semi-honest model. Putting everything together, it is clear that PPODC is secure under the semi-honest model.
D. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we theoretically analyze the computational and communication costs incurred in each stage of the proposed PPODC protocol. The results regarding computational costs are given in Table I . Here m denotes the sum of the numbers of data records of all users, l denotes the number of attributes, k denotes the number of clusters, w 1 = 2k log 2 (m/k) + log 2 l + 2 log 2 (ub) is the maximum bit-length to express the order-preserving distance, and w 2 = 4k log 2 (m/k) + log 2 k + log 2 l + 2 log 2 (ub) is the maximum bit-length to express the left-hand side of Equation 6, where ub represents the maximum possible attribute value. It is important to note that Stage 1 of PPODC is run only once whereas Stage 2 and Stage 3 are run in an iterative manner until the termination condition holds.
In addition, the total communication costs for each stage of PPODC are analyzed and the results are shown in Table  II . Here K denotes the size (in bits) of Paillier encryption key [14] . Following from our results, we can observe that the costs of Stage 2 are significantly higher than the costs incurred in Stage 3 in each iteration. 
E. Boosting the Performance of PPODC
We emphasize that a direct implementation of the PPODC protocol is likely to be inefficient due to involved expensive cryptographic operations. To address this issue, we propose two strategies to boost its performance: (i) offline computation and (ii) pipelined execution. In what follows, we extensively discuss how these two strategies are applicable to improving the performance of PPODC.
1) Offline Computation: In the Paillier cryptosystem [14] , encryption of an integer a ∈ Z N is given by E pk (a) = (1+N ) a * r N mod N 2 , where r is a random integer in Z * N . As a result, an encryption under Paillier is essentially equivalent to one exponentiation operation 2 . Since the computation of r N mod N 2 is independent of a, it could be put to an offline phase. Additionally, the encryption of random numbers, 0s and 1s is independent of the underlying data and thus can be precomputed by the corresponding party (i.e., C 1 or C 2 ).
We emphasize that the actual online computation costs (with an offline phase) of the privacy-preserving primitives used in our protocol can be much less than their costs without an offline phase. For example, consider the secure multiplication (SMP) primitive with E pk (a) and E pk (b) as C 1 's private input. During the execution of SMP, C 1 has to initially randomize the inputs and send them to C 2 . That is, C 1 has to compute E pk (a) * E pk (r 1 ) = E pk (a + r 1 mod N ) and E pk (b) * E pk (r 2 ) = E pk (b + r 2 mod N ), where r 1 and r 2 are random numbers in Z N . This clearly requires C 1 to compute two encryptions: E pk (r 1 ) and E pk (r 2 ). However, since r 1 and r 2 are integers chosen by C 1 at random, the computation of E pk (r 1 ) and E pk (r 2 ) is independent of any specific instantiation of SMP. That is, C 1 can precompute E pk (r 1 ) and E pk (r 2 ) during the offline phase, thus boosting its online computation time. In a similar manner, C 1 and C 2 can precompute certain intermediate results in each privacypreserving primitive.
2) Pipelined Execution: We are able to further reduce the online execution time by adopting the technique of pipelined execution. Take the execution of SMP for example, by which C 1 would like to compute E pk (a 1 * b 1 ) and E pk (a 2 * b 2 ) given E pk (a 1 ), E pk (b 1 ) and E pk (a 2 ), E pk (b 2 ) , respectively. Here C 1 does not have to wait for C 2 's response after sending E pk (a 1 +r 11 ) and E pk (b 1 +r 12 ). Instead, after sending E pk (a 1 + r 11 ) and E pk (b 1 + r 12 ) to C 2 , C 1 immediately computes E pk (a 2 + r 21 ) and E pk (b 2 + r 22 ). By observing that the time needed for C 2 to process E pk (a 1 + r 11 ) and E pk (b 1 + r 12 ) is approximately the same as the time needed for C 1 to process the intermediate result returned from C 2 afterward 3 , we expect that we could further save at least half of the online execution time in the long run when we have a lot of SMP operations to perform. Likewise, we could pipeline the operations involved in the SBD protocol [22] to save around half of the online execution time as well.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we extensively analyze the running time of PPODC by performing various experiments using a real dataset under different parameter settings. Note that ours is the first work to address the PPODC problem requiring a federated cloud consisting of only two service providers and thus there exists no prior work to compare with our protocol.
A. Implementation and Dataset Description
We implemented the protocols in C using the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library [25] . The experiments were conducted on a local cluster consisting of 16 computers, each with an Intel R Xeon TM CPU E5-5320 at 1.86GHz and 8 GBytes of memory, running Linux version 3.17.7.
In our implementation model, the cluster servers communicate with each other when executing the protocols over TCP/IP. The system consists of three components: 1) the master node, 2) a number (ψ) of servers performing the tasks of C 1 , and 3) the same number of servers performing the tasks of C 2 . Since we have 16 servers, we could have up to 8 pairs of servers performing the tasks needed in PPODC. The master node is directly connected with those servers of C 1 , whereas each of C 1 's server is paired with a corresponding server of C 2 . The master node is in charge of the coordination of the execution of tasks needed in PPODC.
For our experiments, we used the KEGG Metabolic Reaction Network (Undirected) dataset from the UCI KDD archive [26] that consists of 65,554 data records and 29 attributes. As part of the pre-processing, we normalized the attribute values and scaled them into the integer domain [0, 1000]. Then we selected sample datasets (from the preprocessed data) by choosing data records at random based on the parameter values under consideration. We fixed the Paillier encryption key size to 1,024 bits (a commonly accepted key size) in all our experiments. For each sample dataset, we share each of its data record attribute-wise among the servers of C 1 and C 2 as mentioned in Stage 1 of PPODC. Note that the secret key sk is stored on C 2 's servers.
B. Performance of PPODC
We evaluate the performance of our protocol based on the following parameters: the number of data records (m), the number of attributes in each data record (l), the number of clusters (k), and the number of pairs of servers (denoted by ψ) deployed when executing PPODC. On our local cluster, ψ varies from 1 to 8 as described previously. Also, we analyze the performance of PPODC based on different modes of execution: (i) the basic implementation without any optimization (denoted by Online + Offline), (ii) the implementation moving the computation of random ciphertexts to the offline phase (denoted by Online), (iii) the implementation that adopts the pipelined execution for SMP and SBD protocol assuming that all needed random ciphertexts are computed offline (denoted by Pipelined Online). In the following experiments, unless otherwise specified, we use m = 6,000, l = 10, k = 4, ψ = 8 and pipelined execution as the default parameters to execute PPODC.
First, we assess the execution time of PPODC for varying values of parameters m, l, and k. The results are given in Figure 1 . In Figure 1(a) , it can be seen that the online execution time of PPODC grows for increasing values of m and k. It is also obvious that the execution time is more sensitive to k than to m or l. This comes from the fact that in Algorithm 1 the time needed by SBD and SMIN k depends not only on the bit-length to express the order-preserving distances but also on the number of clusters. More precisely, when m and l are fixed, the bit-length to express the order-preserving distances is linear in 2k · log 2 (m/k). Hence, it can be seen that the time needed by SBD and SMIN k grows quadratically in k, while the time needed in other parts (SSED OP and SMP) mostly grows linearly in k. In general, the total execution time of PPODC grows almost linear with the number of data records. Similar behavior is seen in Figures 1(b) and 1(c). The total execution time is approximately linear in m but the variation in l only slightly affects the execution time.
Moreover, by moving the computation of random ciphertexts to the offline phase, we save around 55% of the online execution time. If we further pipeline the execution of all invocations to SMP and SBD protocols, we save another 16% of the execution time compared to the basic implementation without any optimization. More specifically, it would take up to 1,190 minutes to perform one single iteration of PPODC (m = 10,000, l = 10, k = 4, and ψ = 8) if none of the optimizations is adopted, whereas only 337 minutes are needed when both optimizations are applied, a saving of 71% with respect to the online execution time. We further note that the average execution time is 293 minutes for each of C 1 's server (excluding waiting time) and 183 minutes for each of C 2 's server. The total execution time (337 minutes) needed is less than the sum of their respective execution time due to the pipelined execution of all instances of SMP and SBD protocols (including those invoked in SSED OP and SMIN k ). To be specific, on average, 87% of the time is spent on computation for each of C 1 's servers, whereas only 54% of the time is spent on computation for each of C 2 's servers.
Lastly, we assess the effectiveness of parallel execution of the secure primitives involved in Stage 2 of our protocol. Recall that in our protocol we can almost achieve record level parallelism. To be precise, before the execution of PPODC, the master node will evenly distribute the n data records evenly to those ψ pairs of servers. Hence, when performing the Step 3 in PPODC, a pair of servers does not have to wait for other pairs of servers since a data record is assigned to exactly one pair of servers for processing. We thus expect the parallel execution of PPODC to be very effective, which is confirmed by Figure  1(d) . When m = 10,000, l = 10, k = 4, it takes 2,676 minutes for 1 pair of servers to finish one iteration of PPODC, while the time is reduced to 337 minutes when 8 pairs of servers are available. The speedup is 2,676/337 = 7.94, which is very close to 8.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC) protocol un- (d) m vs. ψ Fig. 1 . Computation costs of PPODC der a federated cloud environment that can perform the kmeans clustering on the users aggregated encrypted data in a privacy-preserving manner. At the core of our protocol, we proposed new transformations to construct an order-preserving Euclidean distance function and evaluate the termination condition of the k-means clustering algorithm over encrypted data. The proposed PPODC protocol ensures data confidentiality of all users and incurs negligible costs on the user side. In addition, we discussed two techniques to boost the performance of our protocol. A key feature of our protocol is that most of its underlying computations can be parallelized. We implemented our protocol on a cluster of 16 nodes using a real dataset and our experimental results show that its performance can be drastically improved with parallelism. As future work, we will extend the research ideas proposed in this paper to other data mining tasks, such as classification, association rule mining, and regression analysis.
